Training Manuals Used at the School of the Americas:

The Department of Defense and the U.S. Army have repeatedly downplayed the anti-democratic content of the training manuals used at the U.S. Army School of the Americas and by U.S. mobile training teams in Latin America from 1982-91 by claiming that they contain only two dozen negative passages.

The certification report provided in January 1998 by the Defense Department to the foreign operations subcommittee states that the manuals contained only "24 inappropriate or vague statements inserted throughout six publications (1,100 pages) that were otherwise completely consistent with U.S. law and human rights policy." ( p. 2.)

According to this assertion, then, the following excerpts from the manuals, which are not included in the 24 passages, must be "completely consistent with U.S. law and human rights policy." The attached excerpts, only a small sampling, disregard due process and the rule of law, and contain the fundamental confusion between armed insurgents and legitimate, civilian opposition that has led to so many civilian deaths at the hands of Latin American militaries, and which continues to be a problem in countries like Colombia today.

Why does this still matter? Because if the Defense Department, the U.S. Army and the School of the Americas choose not to recognize that this material violates democratic norms, we can hardly have confidence that they will effectively review current curriculum... And because the human rights violations persist.

Manual Excerpts Deemed "Completely Consistent with U.S. Law and Human Rights Policy":

I. The following excerpts, typical of the manuals as a whole, recommend that Latin American militaries preemptively infiltrate opposition political parties, youth groups, unions, civil society organizations; use children, doctors and clergy as sources; take advantage of humanitarian aid programs; and view legal political campaigning as potentially subversive.

"We have already seen how a relatively small number of individuals can come to control an organization by infiltration and fixed elections. The government can inform itself in a timely way about insurgents' activity in these organizations, by placing its agents in all organizations that it suspects could interest the insurgent group. Among the main organizations of this type can be mentioned political parties, unions and youth and student groups." ("Handling of Sources," p. 7)

"AGE: The employees [paid government informants] worthy of greatest confidence are mature, objective and emotionally stable individuals.... Children are, at least, very observant and can provide precise information about things they have seen and heard, if they are interrogated in the appropriate manner." ("Handling of Sources," p. 26)

"The insurgents try to influence the direction, control and authority that is exercised over the nation in general and in the administration of the political system. The insurgents are active in the areas of political nominations, political organizations, political education, and judicial laws. They can resort to subverting the government by means of elections in which the insurgents cause the replacement of an unfriendly government official to one favorable to their cause. The insurgent activity can include disbursing campaign funds to gain members and organizing political meetings for their candidates.... Also, insurgent leaders can participate in political races as candidates for government posts." ("Revolutionary War, Guerillas and Communist Ideology," 1989, p. 51)

"The CI [counterintelligence] agent should take advantage of the aid programs through which the government provides food, clothing, health care and housing for the population. As these are programs with which the government is identified, it is possible to persuade the individuals who have benefitted from them to collaborate in the search for people ready to work with the government." ("Handling of Sources," p. 34)

"Teachers, doctors, social workers and clergy in a local area also can provide a lot of information to the CI agent. These individuals usually have a close relationship with the population and enjoy their respect. They usually maintain a variety of files that can be a useful source of information." ("Handling of Sources," p. 35)

"Before the guerillas take control: The CI agent should consider all organizations as possible guerilla sympathizers. He ought to train and locate informants inside these organizations to inform him about activities and discover any indication of a latent insurrection. We are especially interested in identifying the members of the guerillas commando structure, its political structure and base of support. By infiltrating informants in the diverse youth, workers, political, business, social and charitable organizations, we can identify the organizations that include guerillas among their members. The agent can also identify the relatives of these guerillas, their supporters and sympathizers of the insurrectionary movement.... The CI agent also should investigate other organizations that are not yet under the guerillas' control, since doubtless these will include members who sympathize with the insurrectionary movement; for that reason, it is essential to identify those persons." ("Handling of Sources," p. 75)

"Organizations or groups that are able to be a potential threat to the government also must be identified as targets. Even though the threat may not be apparent, insurgents frequently hide subversive activity behind front organizations. Examples of hostile organizations or groups are paramilitary groups, labor unions, and dissident groups." ("Terrorism and the Urban Guerilla," p. 112)

II. The following excerpts recommend that Latin American militaries institute repressive, controlling measures over the local population, making black lists of suspected civilians, instituting checkpoints, ID cards, curfews and rationing systems, and enforcing measures through arrests and exile. There is no discussion in any of the manuals about a state of siege or other legal measures that would provide a legal basis for such suspension of civil liberties and democratic guarantees. "CIVILIAN SECURITY: In all cases the mission of the military forces has priority over the well-being of the civilians in the area.

Examples of the civilian security measures are: Systematic registering of the civilian personnel, including the neutral foreigners and enemies: This is done by the civilian affairs agency and includes the distribution of rationing cards, work permits, travel permits and permits for crossing borders.... Surveillance of suspect political groups: one should find out whether other groups are sympathetic to enemy cause. Such groups must always be considered potential agents." ("Counterintelligence," pp. 10-11)

Black Lists:

These Contain the Identities and Locations of Persons Whose Capture And Detention Are of Foremost Importance to the Armed Forces; Examples:

a. Enemy agents known or suspects [sic], persons involved in espionage, sabotage, politics, and subversive persons.

b. Hostile para-military guerilla team leaders, known or suspects.

c. Political leaders known or suspected as hostile toward the Armed Forces or the political interests of the National Government.

d. Known or suspected leaders of enemy governments whose presence in the area of operations represent a threat the [sic] national security.

e. Collaborators & sympathizers of the enemy, known or suspects whose presence in the area of operations represent a threat to the national security.

f. Military and civilian enemies, known or suspected of having participated in intelligence activities, counter-intelligence, security, police or political indoctrination between the troops or among civilians.

g. Other personalities identified by the G2 as of immediate detention. This could include local political personalities, chiefs of police, and municipal leaders or leaders of the enemy's government departments." ("Counterintelligence," p. 225)

ORGANIZATIONS AND TEAMS

[This list refers to targets to be detected and "neutralized." While the explanation of the term neutralized in this chapter includes detaining and discrediting but not killing, the term often is used to mean killing. The Defense Department includes the term "neutralize" as part of its list of objectionable terms but does not otherwise contest this passage.]

1. Local or national political party teams, or parties that have goals, beliefs or ideologies contrary or in opposition to the National Government.

2. Para-military organizations including student teams, police, military and veterans, or ex-fighter teams that are hostile towards the National Government.

3. Teams or hostile organizations whose objective is to create dissension or cause restlessness among the civilian population in the area of operations.

4. The central offices of these hostile organizations according to what the Commander of the Armed Forces says will be immediately neutralized. Personalities related with these offices will be arrested and detained.

5. Teams that operate undercover or clandestinely and their infrastructure. ("Counterintelligence," p. 228.)

"The mere elimination of the guerillas does not change in any way the insurgents' basic organization. In order to achieve a permanent victory, the internal defense operations should be planned with the goal of attacking the insurgent organization before the guerillas begin their operations, an attack which includes the secret subversive elements as well as their military arm once the movement reaches the second phase." ("Handling of Sources," p. 5)

"Measures of Controlling the Population and Resources"

1. Surveillance. To control the movement of supplies, equipment, and people, it will be necessary to control and monitor the population's activities. Surveillance measures are used to identify insurgents, identify those who support them, and identify the manner in which aid is provided to the insurgents. Restrictive measures are those that are aimed to isolate the insurgent from the general population, physically and psychologically, denying him his principal source of supply.

2. ID Cards. An effective system of identification is fundamental to the program for controlling the population and resources.

3. Registration. A program of registering families is used to supplement the system of ID cards. This is the system of inventorying all families by house, making a list of all members of the family who live in the house along with the family's resources. One can also note the presence of insurgent tendencies and affiliations among the population.

4. Control by block. The purpose of block-by-block control is to detect the individuals who are supporting or sympathizing with the insurgents and the type of support they are providing.

5. Police patrols. Police patrols can be compared to reconnaissance patrols. Their purpose is to detect sources of insurgent support, sympathizers, and routes used by the insurgent forces for intelligence, logistics, and routine activities and to act to prevent these activities.

Restrictive Measures: Once the collection of information about the insurgents' supply system has been effective, the government forces can efficiently implement restrictive measures.

1. Control of travel and transportation. A program of control of the population and resources must include a system of passes.

2. Curfew. Curfews can be an effective method to restrict movement between specific hours through a specific area or specific routes. The purpose is to permit the authorities to identify violators and take actions based on the premise that anyone who violates the curfew is an insurgent or sympathizes with the insurgents until he can prove the contrary.

3. Checkpoints. It is of little use to establish a program of passes and ID cards unless there is a system of verifying these official papers. Therefore, establishing checkpoints in all travel routes is necessary once the use of passes has started...." ("Terrorism and the Urban Guerilla," pp. 118-119)

"The CI [counterintelligence] personnel must be able to..."

D. Recommend CI targets for exploitation. The CI targets include personalities, organizations and groups, as well as documents and materials. A CI target is someone or something that fits within these categories and that can or cannot be hostile to our cause....

F. Recommend measures of controlling the population and resources....These measures fall within three types of control: surveillance, restriction, and enforcement. The surveillance measures include searches, ID cards and pass books, and control over areas. Restrictive measures include curfews, travel passes, rationing, and restricted areas. Enforcement measures include arrest and exile." ("Revolutionary War, Guerillas and Communist Ideology," 1989, pp.73-74.)

III. The following excerpts cite as indicators of guerrilla control normal civilian activities such as celebrating religious festivals or hosting visitors to a town. If villagers are involved in any kind of protest or simply complain about the government or armed forces, or if they are fearful of sharing intelligence with or being associated with Latin American or U.S. military, they are viewed in these passages as being influenced by guerrillas. Many of the indicators listed are ways civilian population would normally act when afraid of a repressive military.

"Indications of an Imminent Guerilla Attack"

6. Demonstrations by minority groups.

8. In some zones, the local population, including children, don't speak or associate with U.S. troops or host country troops. This invariably indicates one of two things: that guerillas dominate the area or that they intend to launch an attack.

10. A high level of desertions among the paramilitary forces in the host country.

11. Visits of strangers to towns, cities, etc.

16. Celebration of national and religious festivals, as well as birthdays of leaders or key people in the guerilla forces or in a sponsoring power." ("Combat Intelligence," pp. 161-2)

"Indicators of Control [of the Population] by the Guerilla Forces"

2. The local populace refuse to provide intelligence to government forces." ("Combat Intelligence, p. 163)

II. Are the insurgents carrying out psychological operations?

a. Propaganda (indicator)

(1) Accusations of government corruption.

(2) Circulation of petitions that embrace the insurgents' demands.

(3) Attempts to discredit or ridicule government or military officials.

(8) Slogans against the government, the armed forces, or the United States (spoken, posters, graffiti, pamphlets, commercial radio, etc.)

(10) Appeals to people to sympathize with or participate in demonstrations or strikes.

(11) Accusations that the government has failed in its responsibility to meet the basic needs of the people.

(13) Accusations of brutality or torture by the police or armed forces.

Compiled by Lisa Haugaard of the Latin American Working Group (LAWG)

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